

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OLL				
16	C/PAO				
17	SA/IA		X		
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

(Per NSC/ES 1600 3/19, new draft of NSDD "in typewriter" and will be sent to us ASAP - probably by COB 3/20.)


19 March 84

Date

3637 (10-81)

25X1

SECRET




19 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Debrief - McFarlane Meeting, 17 March 1984

-- I stressed the importance of being able to clearly explain the terrorist structure as called for by Senator Nunn - with diagram. The NSDD has been redrafted and should be over here. If not, we can get it. Bud was not clear as to the status of the law against conspiring to maim, etc. He seemed to think a Justice Department opinion would handle the issue satisfactorily. I said that Vessey and I had objected at the NSPG and the issue thrashed out before issuing an NSDD.

-- Reviewed [] matter strongly and promised a response to his letter--have since become inclined to press for a broadened NSDD addressing policy as well as intelligence matters.

-- Discussed limitations on exploitation of Soviet POWs, as well as risks in pressing Pakistan--need to review where this stands and discuss whether there is any harm in discussing the matter with the Paks. There is great ignorance about the facts about previous talks with Pakistanis and what they have been doing in passing out POWs. Need more facts and more careful discussion - Stilwell and Derwinski preparing for a special mission - seems like a strange way to handle this.


William J. Casey

cc: SA/DCI/IA